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Abstract
In fields such as medicine, geography, and mechanics, spatial reasoning involves reasoning about
entities that may coincide without overlapping. Some examples are: cavities and invading particles,
passageways and valves, geographic regions and tropical storms. The purpose of this paper is to
develop a formal theory of spatial relations for domains that include coincident entities. The core of
the theory is a clear distinction between mereotopological relations, such as parthood and connection,
and relative location relations, such as coincidence. To guide the development of the formal theory,
I construct mathematical models in which nontrivial relative location relations are defined.
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1. Introduction
Two entities overlap when they share a common part. Two entities coincide when they
occupy overlapping regions of space.1 The Mississippi River and Minnesota overlap—the
first ten kilometers of the Mississippi River are part of both the river and the state. The
river and the state also coincide—the region occupied by the first ten kilometers of the
E-mail address: maureen.donnelly@ifomis.uni-saarland.de (M. Donnelly).
1 Note that with this usage coincident objects need only occupy overlapping spatial regions. I will use the term
“complete coincidence” for the stronger relation that holds between objects that occupy identical spatial regions.
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Mississippi River is part of both the region occupied by the entire river and the region
occupied by the state. Similarly, my hand and my body both overlap and coincide. It is
easy to see that any overlapping spatial entities must also coincide. Their locations will
overlap at their common parts.
But the relation of coincidence is broader than that of overlap. In other words, there
are pairs of coincident objects which do not share parts. The food that is currently being
digested in my stomach cavity coincides with, but does not overlap, my stomach cavity.
A tropical storm covering Acapulco coincides with, but does not overlap, Mexico. Any
object coincides with, but does not overlap, the spatial region at which it is located at a
given point of time.
A mereotopology is a formal theory of parthood and connection relations. It has long
been recognized that mereotopology forms an essential part of formal ontology. Several
different mereotopologies have been proposed in recent literature, including [1,4,11,17].
These theories are ultimately intended for reasoning about relations among a variety of
spatial entities including material objects (amoebas, mechanical devices, etc.) and geo-
graphical entities (islands, bays, etc.). However, it is assumed in nearly all of this work that
the immediate domains of application are restricted to spatial regions. When material ob-
jects are introduced, as in [8], mereotopological relations are still restricted to regions. The
material objects have only a second-hand mereotopological structure that is inherited from
the regions at which they are located. Thus, a distinct coincidence relation is not usually
introduced in the mereotopology: on domains of regions, coincidence is just overlap.
Likewise, mathematical models for these theories typically use simple domains consist-
ing just of subsets of a topological space. See, for example, [1,3,9]. On these domains, there
is no natural way of giving the coincidence relation a broader interpretation than that of
the overlap relation. Here, overlap is generally interpreted as non-empty intersection.2 The
coincidence relation could have a broader interpretation only if it were artificially extended
to pairs of subsets with an empty intersection.
The goal of this paper is to construct a mereotopology for domains that include coinci-
dent but non-overlapping entities. I present a primary theory, called Layered Mereotopol-
ogy, and two variants of it. Domains for Layered Mereotopology may include both material
objects and the regions at which they are located, in addition to other types of entities,
such as holes or geopolitical entities, which may coincide with material objects. Layered
Mereotopology allows spatial relations to apply directly to all entities within the domain,
be they regions, material objects, holes, or what have you. It extends mereotopology by
adding relative location relations—relations such as coincidence that depend only on the
objects’ locations—and by making explicit the relation between a spatial entity and the
region at which it is located. To guide the development of the formal theory, I construct a
class of mathematical structures, called Layered Models, in which a coincidence relation
distinct from overlap is defined.
Layered Mereotopology borrows much from the theory of location of [7]. It differs in
that it divides the domain into different layers, each of which is mereologically independent
of the others. Also, no models are provided for the Casati and Varzi theory other than
2 The interpretation in [1] is slightly different but in the same spirit.
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the standard topological models that conflate coincidence and overlap. Additional work
on combining either relative location relations or a location function with other spatial
relations can be found in [2,5,8,15].
The outline for this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I construct the Layered Models.
These structures include both mereotopological relations and relative location relations.
Layered Models are the target models of the formal theory, Layered Mereotopology, which
is presented in Sections 3–5. The mereological subtheory, Layered Mereology, is developed
in Section 3. In Section 4, a function that maps each member of the domain to its region
is added and the first group of relative location relations are defined. Topological relations
and more relative location relations are added in Section 5. In the last part of the paper,
I present two variations of Layered Mereotopology, both of which make weaker assump-
tions about the composition of the spatial domain. Section 6 proposes a version of Layered
Mereotopology with weakened requirements on the formation of sums. Section 7 develops
a version of Layered Mereotopology that does not assume that the spatial domain includes
a special sub-domain of regions.
Layered Mereotopology and its two variants are presented here as time-independent
theories. They can be used in this form either to describe instantaneous time-slices of
a three-dimensional domain or to describe space-time relations among changeless four-
dimensional entities such as processes. The theory can also be naturally extended to include
time-dependent relations which can be used to describe change in spatial domains.
2. Layered Models
In this section, I introduce a class of mathematical structures in which both mereotopo-
logical and relative location relations are defined. I call these structures Layered Models be-
cause their domains are partitioned into non-overlapping layers. Members of the same layer
coincide only when they overlap. Members of different layers never stand in mereotopo-
logical relations, but they may coincide or stand in other relative location relations.
Layered Models are intended to represent the actual spatial world in such a way that spa-
tial entities of distinct types—regions, material objects, holes, geographic objects, etc.—
are assigned to distinct layers. In particular, a special layer, covering the entire spatial
domain, represents the collection of all regions. For other types of spatial entities (material
objects, holes, geographical objects, etc.), I leave open the question of whether all tokens
of that type reside on one layer or whether they are distributed to different layers. For ex-
ample, at one extreme, all material objects may be assigned to the same layer and, at the
other extreme, each independent material object (my desk, your car, etc.) may be assigned
to its own layer.
Layered Models are defined as follows. Let T = 〈X, cl〉 be a topological space, where
X is the set of points and cl is the closure operator. Let I be any index set that includes 0.
The domain, D, of a Layered Model is a nonempty set of ordered pairs, xi = 〈x, i〉 where
∅ = x ⊆ X and i ∈ I . (I will generally use the abbreviation xi for 〈x, i〉. All variables referring
to objects in Layered Models appear in Arial font to distinguish them from the variables of
the formal theory.) The first component of each ordered pair determines its location. The
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second component determines the layer to which it belongs. All pairs of the form 〈x,0〉
(i.e., x0) belong to a special layer, called the region layer.
I require that the domain, D, of any Layered Model satisfy the following conditions:
1. For any i ∈ I , if xi ∈ D, then x0 ∈ D.
2. For any i ∈ I and any Y ⊆ ℘(X), if yi ∈ D for all y ∈ Y, then (⋃y∈Y(y))i ∈ D.
3. For any i ∈ I and any xi, yi ∈ D, if x  y, then there is a zi ∈ D such that z ⊆ x and
z ∩ y = ∅.
4. If xi, yi ∈ D and x ∩ y = ∅, then (x ∩ y)i ∈ D.
Note that conditions 1–4 are not very restrictive. Even once the topological space and
index set are fixed, domains with very different compositions are possible. As a token
example, suppose T is the usual topological space based on the real numbers, , and
I = {0,1}. Then {xi: ∅ = x ⊆  and i = 0,1} satisfies conditions 1–4. In this case, the do-
main has uncountably many members. At the other end of the spectrum, {[7,8]0, [7,8]1}
is an example of a layered domain with only two members constructed from the same
topological space and index set.
Given a domain D of a layered model, it follows from condition 2 that for any i ∈ I ,
the sum of all members of D of the form xi is also in D. More precisely, for any i ∈ I , let
Yi = {x: x ⊆ X & xi ∈ D}. Then, by 2, Li = (⋃y∈Yi(y))i ∈ D. I will call Li the Layer i of D.
Notice that it follows from condition 1 that for any i ∈ I , if yi = Layer i and z0 = Layer
0, then y ⊆ z. The region layer always covers the entire space of possible locations. The
other layers may or may not cover the entire background space. Thus, either y = z or
y ⊂ z is possible. For example, both {[7,8]0, [7,8]1} and {[6,7)0, [6,8]0, [7,8]0, [7,8]1}
are possible domains for layered models.
I will now define relations on the domains of Layered Models. Each model-theoretic
relation will be the target interpretation of a relation that is introduced formally in Lay-
ered Mereotopology (Sections 3–6). I will use bold-faced letters for the model-theoretic
relations and plain text for their counterparts in the formal theory.
The mereotopological relations are introduced first.
The parthood relation, P, is defined on the domain, D, of a Layered Model as follows:
P(xi, yj) =: x ⊆ y and i = j.
Notice that it follows from this definition that (i) any xi ∈ D is part of Layer j if and only if
i = j and (ii) only parts of the same layer can stand in the parthood relation.
The overlap relation, O, is defined:
O(xi, yj) =: x ∩ y = ∅ and i = j.
As with parthood, (i) any xi ∈ D overlaps Layer j if and only if i = j and (ii) only parts
of the same layer can overlap. Also notice that it follows from condition 4 above that two
members of D overlap if and only if they have a common part.
The underlap relation, U, is defined:
U(xi, yj) =: i = j.
It follows that two members of the domain underlap if and only if they are parts of the
same layer.
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Finally a connection relation, C, also restricted to parts of the same layer, is defined:C(xi, yj) =: (cl(x) ∩ y = ∅ or x ∩ cl(y) = ∅) and i = j.3
Other mereotopological relations, such as proper parthood, external connection, and
tangential parthood, can be defined in the obvious ways, so that they hold only among
parts of the same layer.
In contrast to the definitions above, the definitions of the relative location relations refer
to only the first coordinates of the ordered pairs. This gives us relations that depend only
on location and may hold between parts of different layers.
Cov(xi, yj) =: x ⊆ y (covering)
Coin(xi, yj) =: x ∩ y = ∅ (coincidence)
CCoin(xi, yj) =: x = y (complete coincidence)
M(xi, yj) =: cl(x) ∩ y = ∅ or x ∩ cl(y) = ∅ (meets)
A(xi, yj) =: x ∩ y = ∅ & (cl(x) ∩ y = ∅ or x ∩ cl(y) = ∅) (abuts)
Finally, I add the function, r, from D to Layer 0 which assigns each member of the
domain to its representative on the region layer:
r(xi) = x0.
When restricted to Layer 0, r is the identity function: for any x0 ∈ D, r(x0) = x0. Also
notice that two objects stand in a given relative location relation if and only if their regions
stand in the corresponding mereotopological relation. For example, two objects coincide if
and only if their regions overlap, two objects meet if and only if their regions are connected,
and so on.
I will conclude this section with a simple example designed to illustrate the way in
which Layered Models can be used to represent spatial relations among regions, material
objects, and immaterial entities such as holes. The background topological space for this
model is 3 with its standard topology. The region layer has as parts the members of the
set {x0: ∅ = x ⊆ 3}.
Suppose that we wish to represent relations holding among a vase, a portion of water
in the vase, a flower standing in the vase, and the interior of the vase. The vase, water,
and flower can be represented, respectively, by parts, v1, w1, and f1, of Layer 1 where the
subsets, v, w, and f, of 3 are disjoint, but connected. The interior of the vase, a hole,
3 Nothing important in what follows hinges on this particular interpretation of the connection relation.
Cxiyj =: cl(x) ∩ cl(y) = ∅ and i = j or
Cxiyj =: x ∩ y = ∅ and i = j
may be used instead. But these alternative interpretations are better suited for somewhat different domains. In the
first case, we probably want to restrict the domains to open regular subsets of the topological space and, in the
second case, to closed regular subsets. In the second case, we should also strengthen the definition of O to keep
it distinct from C.
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is represented by h2 on Layer 2 where h and v are disjoint, but connected, w is a proper
subset of h (w ⊂ h), and h and f have a nonempty intersection (h ∩ f = ∅). According to
this representation, the water is not part of the hole, but the fact that the water is contained
in the interior of the vase is represented in the model by the covering relation, Cov(w1,h2),
holding between w1 and h2. Similarly, the flower does not overlap the interior of the vase,
but the fact that the flower is partially contained in the interior of the vase is represented
by the coincidence relation: Coin(f1,h2). The vase and its interior do not coincide. Nor are
they connected. But the fact that the vase touches its interior is represented by the abutment
relation: A(v1,h2). Finally, every object is exactly co-located with its spatial region. This
is represented in the model by the complete coincidence of the object and its region. For
example, CCoin(v1, v0).
3. Layered Mereology
A mereology is a formal theory of the binary parthood relation. My aim in this section
is to develop a mereology, called Layered Mereology, that is satisfied by the parthood
relation, P, defined on Layered Models. Layered Mereology is extended in Sections 4 and 5
to Layered Mereotopology, a theory that also includes relative location and connection
relations.
3.1. Axioms and basic definitions of Layered Mereology
Layered Mereology (like its extension, Layered Mereotopology) is formulated in first-
order logic. u, v, w, x, y, z are used as variables and a, b, c, d are used as constants.
Relations and functions are represented in the formal theory with plain text letters to
distinguish them from the relations and functions defined in Layered Models. Layered
Mereology assumes one primitive, the binary relation P which, on the intended interpreta-
tion, represents parthood.
The following relations are defined in the formal theory in terms of P:
(D1) PPxy =: Pxy & ∼Pyx
(x is a proper part of y)
(D2) Oxy =: ∃z (Pzx & Pzy)
(x and y overlap)
(D3) Uxy =: ∃z (Pxz & Pyz)
(x and y underlap)
It is easy to see that, if P is interpreted as P in Layered Models, the defined relations O
and U will be interpreted as O and U, respectively.
The axioms of Layered Mereology will be somewhat nonstandard. For example, they
cannot require that any pair of objects have a mereological sum. My goal is to axiomatize
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P in such a way that, when restricted to a single layer, it satisfies the axioms (and axiom
schema) of General Extensional Mereology (GEM):4
(P1) Pxx
(P2) Pxy & Pyx → x = y
(P3) Pxy & Pyz → Pxz
(P4) ∼Pxy → ∃z(Pzx & ∼Ozy)
(GEM5) ∃x φ[x] → ∃z∀w (Owz ↔ ∃x (φ[x] & Owx))
φ[x] in (GEM5) stands for any first-order formula in GEM (or an extension of GEM)
in which only x occurs free. (GEM5) states that if any member of the domain satisfies the
formula φ[x], then there must be a sum of all objects satisfying φ[x]. (GEM5) must be
altered for Layered Mereology because Layered Models only include the sums of objects
that are parts of the same layer.5
I will discuss summation in Layered Mereology in more detail shortly. For now, notice
that the relation P in Layered Models satisfies each of the first four axioms of GEM. They
are therefore used in their original forms as axioms for Layered Mereology.6
The first three axioms require that P is a partial ordering. (P1) says that P is reflexive.
(P2) says that P is anti-symmetric. (P3) says that P is transitive. That (P1)–(P3) are satisfied
by P in Layered Models follows immediately from the fact that P is just the subset relation
restricted to the separate layers.
(P4) says that, if x is not a part of y, then there is some part, z, of x that does not
overlap y. For instance, suppose x is a table and y is one of its proper parts, say one of its
legs. Then, according to (P4), x must have some part (its top or another leg) that does not
overlap y.
(P4) is satisfied in Layered Models by virtue of condition 3 of Section 2.
The following theorem is very useful for proving theorems listed later in this paper. It
is derived from (P1), (P3), and (P4).
(PT1) Pxy ↔ ∀z (Ozx → Ozy)
(x is part of y if and only if for all z, if z overlaps x then z overlaps y)
It follows from (PT1) and (P2) that overlap, O, is extensional. This means that any two
members of the domain that overlap the same objects are identical.
(PT2) x = y ↔ ∀z (Ozx ↔ Ozy)
(x is identical to y if and only if for all z, z overlaps x if and only if z overlaps y)
4 Throughout this paper, initial universal quantifiers are suppressed unless they are needed for clarity.
5 In some mereologies, a stronger second-order formula, requiring there to be a sum of any nonempty set of
individuals, is used instead of the first-order schema (GEM5). See, e.g., [13] and [18]. For reasons of simplicity,
I will consider only the first-order version of GEM and develop Layered Mereology as a first-order alternative to
GEM. But the same strategy can be used to construct a second-order version of Layered Mereology that parallels
the mereologies of [13] or [18].
6 All axioms of Layered Mereology are labeled with a “P”. “PT” is used for theorems of Layered Mereology.
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(PT2) lets us use the overlap relation to uniquely identify sums when they exist. Because
O is extensional, for any formula φ[x], if we can assign z to a member of the domain that
satisfies
∀w (Owz ↔ ∃x (φ[x] & Owx)) (∗)
then this object is the unique sum of all φ-ers. However, there need not be an object satis-
fying (∗) even if some member of the domain satisfies φ[x]. For example, let φ[x] be x = x
and let D be the domain of a Layered Model. Then every member of D satisfies φ[x]. But
if there are xi, yj ∈ D with i = j, then no member of D satisfies (∗). This is because such an
object would have to overlap every member of D and there can be no member of D that
overlaps both xi and yj for i = j.
Thus, we need a restricted version of (GEM5) that requires sums to exist only if all
summands are part of the same layer. Such an axiom schema will be satisfied in all Layered
Models by virtue of condition 2 of Section 2. Given that two objects in a Layered Model
are parts of the same layer if and only if they underlap, the restricted summation axiom
schema can read as follows:
(P5) (∃x φ[x] & ∀x,y(φ[x] & φ[x/y] → Uxy)) → ∃z ∀w(Owz ↔ ∃x (φ[x] & Owx))
Here, φ[x/y] is the formula φ[x] with all free instances of x replaced by y and where
variable substitution is performed as necessary so y is free in φ[x/y] exactly where x is
free in φ[x]. (P5) says that if there is some object that satisfies φ[x] and any two objects
that satisfy φ[x] underlap, then there is a sum of all objects satisfying φ[x].
For convenience, I will use the abbreviation zx(φ[x]) for specific substitution in-
stances of the formula (∗). For example, zx(Pxa ∨ Pxb) is the open formula:
∀w (Owz ↔ ∃x ((Pxa ∨ Pxb) & Owx))
and cy(Pya ∨ Pyb) is the closed formula:
∀w (Owc ↔ ∃y ((Pya ∨ Pyb) & Owy)).
We would like to be able to say more things about layers within the mereology. So far,
we can only say that two objects are on the same layer. We would like to be able to say
that a certain object is a layer or is the layer of a particular object. (D4) defines a relation
holding between y and z when z is the sum of all objects that y underlaps. I use this for the
definition of the layer relation.
(D4) Lyz =: zx(Uxy)
(z is y’s layer: z is the sum of all objects that y underlaps)
It is easy to see that when P is interpreted as P in Layered Models, Lxiyj holds if and
only if yj = Layer i. However, axioms (P1)–(P5) do not allow us to infer that for any object,
y, there is some object that is the sum of all objects underlapping y. In other words, our
axioms so far do not allow us to infer that every object has a layer. This would follow from
(P5) if we knew that any two objects that underlap y must underlap each other. Given that
U is already reflexive and symmetric, the antecedent of the relevant substitution instance of
(P5) will be satisfied if U is also transitive. Notice that the underlap relation, U, for Layered
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Models is in fact an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric, and transitive) and that the
sets consisting of all objects in a single layer are the equivalence classes determined by the
U relation.
But although it follows from (P1)–(P5) that U is reflexive and symmetric, it does not
follow that U is transitive. To see this, consider the model of (P1)–(P5) which consists of
the intervals, [0,5], [0,3], [3,5], [5,8], [3,8], with P interpreted as the subset relation. See
Fig. 1.
[0,3] and [3,5] underlap (they are both part of [0,5]). [3,5] and [5,8] underlap (they
are both part of [3,8]). But [0,3] and [5,8] do not underlap. Notice also that [3,5] has no
layer. [3,5] underlaps every member of the domain. Thus, its layer would have to overlap
every member of the domain. But there is no object in this model that overlaps every
member of the domain.
I, therefore, add a final axiom to Layered Mereology:
(P6) (Uxy & Uyz) → Uxz
(underlap is transitive)
It follows from (P5), (P6), and the reflexity and symmetry of U that every object has a
layer:
(PT3) ∀y ∃z Lyz
(every object has a layer)
Thus the relation, L, is a function. I will use the function term l(x) to stand for the layer
of x.
The next group of theorems about layers follow from (D4) and the fact that U is an
equivalence relation:
(PT4) Pxl(x)
(every object is part of its layer)
(PT5) Uxy ↔ l(x) = l(y)
(two objects underlap if and only if they have the same layer)
(PT6) Uxy ↔ Pyl(x)
(x underlaps y if and only if y is part of x’s layer)
It also follows from (P6) that overlap implies underlap.
(PT7) Oxy → Uxy
(if x and y overlap, then they underlap)
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3.2. Layers and maximal individualsWe can introduce the unary predicate, LY, which distinguishes certain members of the
domain as layers.
(D5) LYz =: ∃x Lxz
(z is a layer)
When P is interpreted as P in Layered Models, LY is interpreted as {Layer i: i ∈ I }.
It follows easily from (PT4), (PT5), and (D5) that:
(PT8) LYz ↔ Lzz
(z is a layer iff z is its own layer)
(PT8) tells us that layers are those members of the domain that are the mereological sums
of all objects they underlap.
Unfortunately, (PT8) may not be especially helpful if our goal is to distinguish layers in
a practical reasoning context. We do not usually talk about the underlap relation in practical
contexts and it is, therefore, somewhat difficult to form an intuitive picture of the collection
of all individuals that a given individual underlaps. We can get a better understanding of
what layers might be by introducing the following predicate, defined in terms of parthood
and overlap, which is equivalent to LY in Layered Mereology.
(D6) MIz =: ∀x(Oxz → Pxz)
(z is a maximal individual: for all x, if x overlaps z, then x is part of z)
Maximal individuals are individuals that only overlap their own parts. In particular, maxi-
mal individuals are never proper parts.
(PT9) MIz →∼ ∃x PPzx
(if z is a maximal individual, then there is no x such that z is a proper part of x)
It follows from (P1)–(P4) and (P6) that being a maximal individual is equivalent to
being a layer.
(PT10) MIz ↔ LYz
(z is a maximal individual if and only if z is a layer)
In fact, given (P1)–(P4), the following two formulae are, taken together, equivalent to (P5)
and (P6):
(P5*) (∃x φ[x] & ∃z(MIz & ∀x(φ[x] → Pxz)) → ∃z ∀w(Owz ↔ ∃x (φ[x] & Owx))
(if some member of the domain satisfies φ[x] and there is a maximal individual, z, such
that all φ-ers are part of z, then there is a sum of all φ-ers)
(P6*) ∀x∃z(MIz & Pxz)
(every individual is part of some maximal individual)
Thus, Layered Mereology can be equivalently axiomatized by (P1)–(P4), (P5*), and (P6*).
In this alternative axiomatization, all formulae referring to the underlap relation are re-
placed by formulae referring to maximal individuals.
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What, then, are the layers, or maximal individuals, of a spatial domain? They are the
individuals that share parts only with their own parts. Just what, more specifically, these
individuals are will depend on one’s assumptions about the structure of the world. Layered
Mereology is designed to accommodate different kinds of ontologies. If one holds that a
common-sense material object, such as a table, a television, or a human body, is not part of
any larger object and does not share parts with any object that extends beyond itself, then
each of these objects is its own layer. If, on the other hand, one holds that there is a sum
of any collection of material objects, but that no entity includes both material objects and
other types of entities (regions, holes, etc.) as parts, then the sum of all material objects is
a layer. At the furthest extreme, one may even hold that there is a sum of any collection of
individuals. In this case, the sum of all individuals is the only layer.
Similar considerations apply to other types of entities. For example, if one holds that
the interior of my coffee cup (a hole) overlaps only its own parts, then the interior of my
coffee cup is a layer. If, on the other hand, one holds that there is a sum of any collection
of holes, then all holes belong to the same layer.
In the full theory, Layered Mereotopology, only one restriction is put on the way in
which different types of entities are divided into layers. I add in Section 4 axioms requiring
that there is a layer consisting of all regions. It follows from these axioms that if there is
only one layer, then every individual is a region.
3.3. Additional mereological relations
We can use the formula schema zx(φ[x]) to introduce relational counterparts of fa-
miliar Boolean operators. (D7)–(D9) are the standard mereological definitions of the sum,
product, and difference relations. (D10) defines a relative complement relation.
(D7) +(v,y, z) =: zx(Pxv ∨ Pxy)
(z is the binary sum of v and y)
(D8) ×(v,y, z) =: zx(Pxv & Pxy)
(z is the binary product of v and y)
(D9) −(v,y, z) =: zx(Pxy & ∼Oxv)
(z is the difference of v in y)
(D10) -(v, z) =: zx(Uxv & ∼Oxv)
(z is the relative complement of v)
The following existence theorems can be derived:
(PT11) ∃z(+(x,y, z)) ↔ Uxy
(x and y have a sum if and only if x and y underlap)
(PT12) ∃z(×(x,y, z)) ↔ Oxy
(x and y have a product if and only if x and y overlap)
(PT13) ∃z(−(x,y, z)) ↔ ∼Pyx
(there is a difference of x in y if and only if y is not part of x)
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(PT14) ∃z(-(x, z)) ↔ ∼LYx
(x has a relative complement if and only if x is not a layer)
We can also derive the following correspondence between the relative complement re-
lation and the difference relation.
(PT15) -(x, z) ↔ −(x, l(x), z)
(z is x’s relative complement if and only if z is the difference of x in x’s layer)
Using (PT5) it is easy to prove that, when they exist, sums, products, and relative com-
plements belong to the same layer as the original object(s). If it exists, the difference of x
in y belongs to the same layer as y. This need not be also x’s layer. In fact, if x does not
belong to the same layer as y, then y itself is the difference of x in y.
3.4. Layered Mereology and General Extensional Mereology (GEM)
Meta-Theorem 1. Layered Mereology is a subtheory of GEM.
Proof. It is obvious that (P1)–(P4) can be derived from the axioms of GEM—they are in-
cluded in the axiomatization of GEM given in Section 3.1. (P5) is an obvious consequence
of (GEM5). To see that (P6) can also be derived, we need only note that
∀x∀yUxy
is a theorem of GEM. (Taking x = x for φ[x] in (GEM5), we can prove that there is an
individual of which every member of the domain is part.) It follows immediately that U is
transitive (P6). 
Thus, any model of GEM is a one-layer model of Layered Mereology.
Conversely, any one-layer model of Layered Mereology is a model of GEM. We can
show, more generally, that any layer of a model of Layered Mereology is a model of GEM.
Meta-Theorem 2. Let M be any model of Layered Mereology with domain, D. Note that
M need not belong to the class of Layered Models defined in Section 2. Let P , O, U , l
be, respectively, the interpretations of P, O, U, l in M. Let c ∈ D and let Dc = {y: y ∈
D & l(y) = l(c)}. Let Mc be the structure whose domain is Dc with P interpreted as P |Dc
(i.e., the restriction of P to Dc). Then Mc satisfies axioms (P1)–(P4) and axiom schema
(GEM5).
Proof. Note that, because M is a model of Layered Mereology, whenever x ∈ Dc and
either 〈x, z〉 or 〈z, x〉 is a member of P , O, or U , then l(z) = l(x) = l(c) and z ∈ Dc. Also,
note that when P is interpreted as P |Dc in Dc, each defined relation of Layered Mereology
is interpreted as the restriction of its M-interpretation to Dc. For example, O and U are
interpreted in Mc as, respectively, O |Dc and U |Dc. Notice further that U |Dc is Dc × Dc.
It follows trivially that, since P is a partial ordering, so is P |Dc. Thus, (P1)–(P3) are
satisfied in Mc.
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To see that (P4) is satisfied in Mc, suppose that x, y ∈ Dc and 〈x, y〉 /∈ P |Dc. Then 〈x, y〉 /∈
P . Since (P4) is satisfied in M, there is some z ∈ D such that 〈z, x〉 ∈ P & 〈z, y〉 /∈ O. Since
〈z, x〉 ∈ P , z ∈ Dc. Thus, 〈z, x〉 ∈ P |Dc. Since 〈z, y〉 /∈ O, 〈z, y〉 /∈ O |Dc.
For (GEM5): Let φ[x] be a first-order formula (with only x free) in an extension, T, of
Layered Mereology where the interpretation of each primitive of T on Dc is the restriction
of its interpretation on D. Suppose there is some b ∈ Dc such that b satisfies φ[x] in Mc.
Let φ∗[x] be a formula obtained from φ[x] by: (1) constructing a formula φ′[x] equiva-
lent to φ[x] in which only primitives of T occur and then (2) restricting the range of all
quantification in φ′[x] to Dc.
Lemma 1. If x ∈ Dc, then x satisfies φ∗[x] in M if and only if x satisfies φ[x] in Mc.
Lemma 1 is proved by induction on the number of connectives in φ′[x]. The proof is
tedious, but straightforward and will be omitted.
Let b be a constant denoting b. Then:
Lemma 2. (φ∗[x] & Uxb) is satisfied in M by x ∈ D if and only if x satisfies φ[x] in Mc.
Lemma 2 follows immediately from Lemma 1, and the fact that x satisfies (φ∗[x] & Uxb)
in M if and only if x satisfies φ∗[x] in M and x ∈ Dc.
By Lemma 2, since b satisfies φ[x] in Mc, b satisfies (φ∗[x] & Uxb) in M. Thus,
M |= ∃x (φ∗[x] & Uxb).
Also,
M |= ∀x,y(((φ∗[x] & Uxb) & (φ∗[x/y] & Uyb))→ Uxy).
(To see this, note that by the transitivity and symmetry of U, M |= ∀x, y((Uxb & Uyb) →
Uxy).) Thus, since (P5) is satisfied in M,
M |= ∃z ∀w(Owz ↔ ∃x ((φ∗[x] & Uxb) & Owx)).
Let s be the unique member of D that satisfies
∀w(Owz ↔ ∃x ((φ∗[x] & Uxb) & Owx))
in M. Since 〈s,b〉 ∈ O , s ∈ Dc. I will show that s satisfies ∀w(Owz ↔ ∃x (φ[x] & Owx))
in Mc:
(i) Suppose 〈w, s〉 ∈ O |Dc. Then 〈w, s〉 ∈ O and there is x ∈ D such that x satisfies
(φ∗[x] & Uxb) in M and 〈w, x〉 ∈ O. By Lemma 2, x satisfies φ[x] in Mc. Thus, w satisfies
∃x(φ[x] & Owx) in Mc.
(ii) Let w, x ∈ Dc. Suppose (φ[x] & Owx) is satisfied in Mc when w is interpreted as
w and x is interpreted as x. By Lemma 2, (φ∗[x] & Uxb) is satisfied by x in M. Since
〈w, x〉 ∈ O, ((φ∗[x] & Uxb) & Owx) is satisfied in M when w is interpreted as w and x is
interpreted as x. Thus, 〈w, s〉 ∈ O . So 〈w, s〉 ∈ O|Dc.
It follows from (i) and (ii) that the assumption
Mc |= ∃x φ[x]
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impliesMc |= ∃z ∀w
(
Owz ↔ ∃x (φ[x] & Owx)).
Thus, any instance of the axiom schema (GEM5) is satisfied in Mc.
4. The region function
In Layered Mereology, we have no way of stating that two objects coincide. Layered
Mereology lets us describe the parthood relations between objects. It does not let us de-
scribe the relative locations of objects. To do this, I extend Layered Mereology by adding
the unary function r which, on the intended interpretation, assigns each object, x, to the
region, r(x), at which x is exactly located. In Layered Models, r is interpreted as the func-
tion r.
Using r, we can define a one-place predicate, R, which distinguishes the sub-domain of
regions.
(D11) Ry =: ∃x(r(x) = y)
(y is a region)
When r is interpreted as r in Layered Models, the interpretation of R is {xi ∈ D: i = 0}.
The axioms for r are added to axioms (P1)–(P6).7 It is easy to check that they are
satisfied in Layered Models.
(R1) Ry & Rz → Uyz
(all regions are located in the same layer)
(R2) Ry & Uyz → r(z) = z
(every member of the region layer is its own region)
The theorems below can now be derived.
(RT1) Ry → r(y) = y
(every region is located at itself)
(RT2) r(r(x)) = r(x)
(the region function is idempotent)
(RT3) Ry & Uyz → Rz
(every member of a region’s layer is a region)
(RT4) ∀x(φ[x] → Rx) & zx(φ[x]) → Rz
(every sum of regions is a region)
Additional axioms relate the region function to parthood.
(R3) Pxy → Pr(x)r(y)
(if x is part of y, then x’s region is part of y’s region)
7 All axioms specific to the r function are marked with “R”. Theorems specific to the r function are marked
with “RT”.
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The following theorem is derived from (R3) and the mereological axioms.
(RT5) Oxy → Or(x)r(y)
(if x overlaps y, then x’s region overlaps y’s region)
Notice that the converse of (R3) is not generally satisfied in Layered Models. r(xi) may
be part of r(yj) even though xi is not part of yj. This will be the case whenever x ⊆ y,
but i = j. In fact, given the antisymmetry of P (P2) and the idempotency of r (RT2), the
converse of (R3) would imply that every member of the domain is identical to its region.
Thus, the converse of (R3) would reduce the domain to a single layer of regions.
On the other hand, in Layered Models, if P(r(xi), r(yj)) and i = j, then P(xi, yj) must also
hold. More generally, if O(r(xi), r(yj)) and i = j, then O(xi, yj) must also hold. I therefore
add the following axiom.
(R4) Uxy & Or(x)r(y) → Oxy
(if x and y are on the same layer and x’s region overlaps y’s region, then x overlaps y)8
From (R4), it follows that whenever the regions of two objects in the same layer stand in
a given mereological relation, then the objects themselves also stand in that relation. In
particular, we can derive the following theorem.
(RT6) Uxy & Pr(x)r(y) → Pxy
(if x and y are in the same layer and x’s region is part of y’s region, then x is part of y)
Notice that, given (P1)–(P6) and (R1)–(R3), (R4) could not have been derived from
(RT6). To see this, consider the model of (P1)–(P6), (R1)–(R3), and (RT6) whose domain
consists of
Layer 0: [0,1]0, [1,1]0, [1,2]0, [0,2]0
Layer 1: [0,1]1, [1,2]1, [0,2]1
with both P and r interpreted as in Layered Models. Here, the region, [0,1]0, of [0,1]1
overlaps the region, [1,2]0, of [1,2]1 ([1,1]0 is a part of both), but [0,1]1 and [1,2]1 do
not overlap. Thus, (R4) is not satisfied in this model.
The structure described in the previous paragraph is not a Layered Model because it
does not satisfy condition 4 of Section 2, requiring that whenever xi, yi ∈ D and x ∩ y = ∅,
then (x ∩ y)i ∈ D. We can weaken this condition somewhat and still retain (R4),9 but (R4)
at least requires that the overlap relations among objects on any given layer mirror those of
their images in the region layer. If we wanted, for example, to allow regions to have point-
like products, but material objects to have only three-dimensional products, then we would
have to give up (R4). We could allow such “mixed granularity” models if, for example, we
replaced (R4) with the weaker (RT6).
8 To see that (R4) does not follow from the preceding axioms, consider the model of (P1)–(P6) and (R1)–(R3)
whose domain consists of Layer 0: [0,1]0; Layer 1: [0,1]1, (1,2]1, [0,2]1; where P is interpreted as in Layered
Models, but r is interpreted so that [0,1]0 is the region of all members of the domain. Here, the region of [0,1]1
overlaps the region of (1,2]1, but [0,1]1 and (1,2]1 do not overlap.
9 For example, if we wanted to restrict the first components of the ordered pairs to non-empty closed regular
subsets of the topological space, we could replace 4 with: if xi, yi ∈ D and int(x∩ y) = ∅, then cl(int(x ∩ y))i ∈ D.
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The relative location relations are defined formally in terms of the region function, r.
(D12) CCoin(x,y) =: r(x) = r(y)
(x and y completely coincide)
(D13) Cov(x,y) =: Pr(x)r(y)
(x is covered by y)
(D14) Coin(x,y) =: Or(x)r(y)
(x and y coincide)
It is easy to check that when P is interpreted as P and r as r in Layered Models, CCoin,
Cov, and Coin are interpreted as, respectively, CCoin, Cov, and Coin.
The following theorems concerning these relations can be derived.
(RT7) Coin(x,y) ↔ ∃z (Cov(z,x) & Cov(z,y))
(x and y coincide if and only if there is some z that is covered by both x and y)
(RT8) CCoin(x,y) ↔ Cov(x,y) & Cov(y,x)
(x and y completely coincide if and only if y covers x and x covers y)
(RT9) CCoin(x,y) & CCoin(x, z) & Uyz → y = z
(any object can completely coincide with at most one object in any layer)
(RT10) CCoin(x,y) & Uxy → x = y
(if x and y completely coincide and are on the same layer, then x = y)
(RT11) Cov(x,y) & Uxy → Pxy
(if y covers x and x and y are on the same layer, then x is part of y)
(RT12) Coin(x,y) & Uxy → Oxy
(if x and y coincide and are on the same layer, then x and y overlap)
(RT10)–(RT12) tell us that when two objects in the same layer stand in one of the rela-
tive location relations above, then they must also stand in the corresponding mereological
relation. This implies, for example, that two parts of the same individual can coincide only
when they overlap.
In addition to the theorems listed above, we can prove that CCoin is an equivalence
relation, that Cov is transitive and reflexive, and that Coin is symmetric and reflexive.
Also, the implications illustrated in the diagram below can be derived. The arrow indicates
that the atomic formula at the start of the arrow implies the atomic formula at the end of
the arrow.
Coin(x,y)
Oxy Cov(x,y)
Pxy CCoin(x,y)
x = y
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5. Layered MereotopologyThe base theory can be extended to Layered Mereotopology in a straightforward way
by adding a connection relation, C, where Cxy means “x is connected to y”. I assume that
only parts of the same maximal individual may be connected. For example, my hand is
connected to my forearm—they are parts of my body that touch one another. By contrast,
the vase and its interior, as described in Section 2, are not connected because they do not
belong to the same maximal individual. Instead, the vase and its interior stand in the relative
location relation, abuts.
C is interpreted as C in Layered Models. The axioms for C are as follows.10
(C1) Cxx
(connection is reflexive)
(C2) Cxy → Cyx
(connection is symmetric)
(C3) Pxy → ∀z(Czx → Czy)
(if x is part of y, everything connected to x is connected to y)
(C4) Cxy → Uxy
(if x and y are connected, then they are parts of the same layer)
(C5) Cxy → Cr(x)r(y)
(if x and y are connected, their regions are also connected)
(C6) Uxy & Cr(x)r(y) → Cxy
(if x and y are members of the same layer and their regions are connected, then x and y are
connected)
The external connection relation is defined in terms of C and O in the usual way.
(D15) ECxy =: Cxy & ∼Oxy
(x and y are externally connected: x and y are connected but do not overlap)
It follows immediately that external connection, like connection, can only hold among
parts of the same layer.
(CT1) ECxy → Uxy
The relative location relations meets (M) and abuts (A) are defined in terms of the
region function:
(D16) Mxy =: Cr(x)r(y)
(x and y meet: their regions are connected)
(D17) Axy =: ECr(x)r(y)
(x and y abut: their regions are externally connected)
10 Axioms specific to Layered Mereotopology are marked with a “C”. Theorems are marked with “CT”.
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For example, the vase and its interior both meet and abut. The flower standing in the
vase meets, but does not abut, the interior of the vase.
It is easy to check that if C is interpreted as C in Layered Models, then M is interpreted
as M and A is interpreted as A.
We can prove that M is reflexive and symmetric and that both EC and A are irreflexive
and symmetric. We can also derive the following theorems:
(CT2) Cxy → Mxy
(if x and y are connected, then x and y meet)
(CT3) ECxy → Axy
(if x and y are externally connected, then x and y abut)
(CT4) (Uxy & Mxy) → Cxy
(if x and y are on the same layer and they meet, then they are connected)
(CT5) (Uxy & Axy) → ECxy)
(if x and y are on the same layer and they abut, then they are externally connected)
(CT6) Axy ↔ (Mxy & ∼Coin(x,y))
(x and y abut if and only if they meet and do not coincide)
The tangential part relation, TP, is usually defined in terms of external connection as
follows (see, for example, [1,9]):
TPxy =: Pxy & ∃z(ECzx & ECzy) (∗∗)
This definition is not appropriate for Layered Mereotopology. To see why, consider the
Layered Model whose underlying topological space is  with its standard topology and
whose layers have the members of the following sets as parts:
Layer 0: {x0: ∅ = x ⊆ }
Layer 1: {x1: ∅ = x ⊆ [0,1]}
It would follow from the standard definition of TP that [0,1]1 has no tangential parts, since
it is not externally connected to any member of the domain. For example, it would follow
that [0,0]1 and [1,1]1 are not tangential parts of [0,1]1.
In the context of Layered Mereotopology, (∗∗) would tell us that no maximal individual
has any tangential parts. Thus, for example, if a human body were considered a maximal
object, (∗∗) would not enable us to distinguish between external body parts, like fingers
and skin, and internal body parts, like the heart.
I will therefore use instead the following definition of tangential part:
(D18) TPxy =: Pxy & ∃z(Azx & Azy)
(x is a tangential part of y: x is part of y and there is some z such that z abuts both x and y)
Applying this definition to the previous model, it turns out that any part of [0,1]1 that
contains either [0,0]1 or [1,1]1 is a tangential part of [0,1]1. More generally, it follows
from (D18) that, for objects x and y in the same layer, x is a tangential part of y if and only
if x’s region is a tangential part of y’s region:
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(CT7) Uxy → (TPxy ↔ TPr(x)r(y)).
Interior parthood is then defined as usual:
(D19) IPxy =: Pxy & ∼TPxy
(x is an interior part of y)
It may be useful to add cross-layer counterparts of the tangential part and interior part
relations:
(D20) T Cov(x,y) =: TPr(x)r(y)
(x is t-covered by y: x’s region is a tangential part of y’s region)
(D21) I Cov(x,y) =: IPr(x)r(y)
(x is i-covered by y: x’s region is an interior part of y’s region)
With these two additional relations we can, for example, distinguish between the way in
which a table is covered by a room’s interior (t-covered) and the way in which a computer
on the table is covered by the room’s interior (i-covered).
If desired, relational counterparts of topological operators can be added in the usual
way. For instance, an object’s interior can be defined as the sum of its interior parts:
(D22) INT(y, z) =: zx(IPxy)
(z is the interior of y)
Since each layer of any model of Layered Mereology is a model of GEM (Section 2,
Meta-theorem 2), it is trivial to show that each layer of any model of Layered Mereotopol-
ogy is a model of the standard mereotopology which uses (∗∗) as the definition of tangen-
tial parthood and includes axioms (C1)–(C3) in addition to those of GEM. (See [7] for a
discussion of this mereotopology.) However, notice that the interpretations of TP and IP
on the reduced single-layer models may not match their interpretations on the larger multi-
layer model. In the standard mereotopological model whose domain is limited to Layer 1
of the previous example (with P and C interpreted as in the Layered Model),
{
x1: ∅ = x ⊆ [0,1]
}
[0,1]1 does not have any tangential parts.
Though the separate layers within a model of Layered Mereotopology function indepen-
dently as mereological structures, they are not entirely independent as mereotopological
structures. It is an obvious consequence of definition (D18) that we may need to look at
the spatial structure beyond an object’s layer to determine whether it has any tangential
parts.
It is easy to see, however, that the region layer, at least, must always have a
self-contained mereotopological structure. When the domain of any model of Layered
Mereotopology is restricted to the region layer and P and C are interpreted as in the larger
model, then the interpretations of EC, TP, and IP (with TP defined via (∗∗)) will always
be the restrictions to the region layer of their interpretations in the larger model.
The overall strategy of Layered Mereotopology can be summarized as follows: the spa-
tial domain is partitioned into layers in such a way that mereotopological relations hold
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only among parts of the same layer. This allows us, when the context warrants, to down-
size to a more standard single-layer mereotopological model, as long as care is taken with
the interpretations of TP and IP. The weaker cross-layer relative location relations are dis-
tinct from the mereotopological relations in multiple-layered models, but collapse into their
mereotopological counterparts when the domain consists of a single layer.
My goal in developing Layered Mereotopology has been to formulate a theory for mixed
spatial domains in which the relative location relations are distinct from the mereotopolog-
ical relations. I have tried to make the theory flexible on other ontological issues so that
it will be compatible with a variety of positions. For example, Layered Mereotopology al-
lows models in which each member of the domain is the sum of atoms as well as models in
which every member of the domain has a proper part. Also, as discussed in Section 3, the
layers may be interpreted so as to include either all or only some entities of a given type.
Thus the theory is compatible with the assumption that there is a sum of any collection of
material objects. But it is also compatible with the assumption that common-sense objects
(tables, chairs, etc.) are maximal individuals.
Some slight changes in the underlying mereotopology can be easily made to accom-
modate different assumptions about the relation between parthood and connection. For
instance, we could use a stronger version of (C3), in which the implication is replaced by
a biconditional. In this case, each layer would be a model of the stronger mereotopology
that uses the biconditional instead of (C3).
The purpose of the final part of this paper is to discuss two more substantial possible
changes in Layered Mereotopology. In Section 6, I present an alternate version of Layered
Mereotopology in which the summation requirements are weakened. In Section 7, I present
a version of Layered Mereotopology that does not assume its domains contain a distinct
layer of regions.
6. Layered Mereotopology with Weakened Summation requirements
At one extreme, the spatial domain can be represented in terms of Layered Mereotopol-
ogy as a single-layer model. (P5) would then imply that there is a sum of any nonempty
collection of spatial entities satisfying a given formula φ[x]. (R1) and (R2) would imply
that every member of the spatial domain is a region.
At the other extreme, we can treat each common-sense individual (my table, the interior
of your coffee cup) as a maximal individual. On this interpretation, there could be no sum
of all material objects, no sum of all holes, and so on. But, (P5) would still require that
there is a sum of any nonempty collection of parts of a given maximal individual satisfying
a formula φ[x]. Thus, for example, given that all four legs of my table are parts of the
table, (P5) requires that the table has as additional parts the sums of any two of its legs
(e.g., the sum of the back left leg and the right front leg). In particular, (P5) requires here
that there are scattered material objects, where a scattered object is an object that is the
sum of disconnected parts (like the table legs).
These sums, though perhaps unintuitive, are not necessarily problematic. After all, we
can, when it is convenient, talk comfortably about scattered sums such as my pair of gloves.
Nevertheless, if desired, it is easy to construct a weaker version of Layered Mereotopology
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which does not commit us to arbitrary sums of the parts of a given maximal individual.
I will call the weaker version of the full theory Weak Summation Layered Mereotopology
(WSLM).
WSLM can be axiomatized by deleting (P5*) (which asserts that if some member of
the domain satisfies φ[x] and all φ-ers are part of the same maximal individual, then there
is a sum of all φ-ers) from the alternative axiomatization for Layered Mereology given in
Section 3.2. The region function axioms and topological axioms are left unchanged. The
axioms for WSLM are, then, (P1)–(P4), (P6*), (R1)–(R4), and (C1)–(C6).
Surprisingly, we lose very few of the theorems listed in Sections 3–5 in WSLM. Of
these, only (PT11)–(PT14) (the theorems giving the conditions for the existence of binary
sums, binary products, differences, and relative complements) are not also theorems of
WSLM. In particular, when the layer relation, L, and the layer predicate, LY, are defined
as in Section 3, we can still prove that every individual has a layer and that being a layer is
equivalent to being a maximal individual:11
(WSLMT1) ∀y ∃z Lyz
(WSLMT2) LYz ↔ MIz.
In addition, (P6) of the original axiomatization of Layered Mereology is a theorem of
WSLM:
(WSLMT3) Uxy & Uyz → Uxz
(underlap is transitive)
In WSLM, as opposed to Layered Mereotopology, we are free to hold that some material
objects consist only of nonoverlapping, self-connected proper parts. We may, if we like,
hold that only its top and its four separate legs are proper parts of my table. Alternatively,
we may hold that there are sums of the collection of all instances of a given universal (the
sum of all tables, the sum of all human bodies), but not sums of random sub-collections of
these (the sum of my table and your table).
Since WSLM is a subtheory of Layered Mereotopology, all models of Layered
Mereotopology, including the Layered Models of Section 2, are models of WSLM. But
we obtain a broader class of models for WSLM (call them WS Layered Models) by inter-
preting P, r, and C, as in Layered Models but replacing condition 2 on the domains of the
models with:
2∗. Let Yi = {x: x ⊆ X & xi ∈ D}. Then, Li =
(⋃
y∈Yi(y)
)
i ∈ D.
Conditions 1, 3, and 4 are retained in their original forms. Condition 2∗ requires only that
the sum of all pairs with the same second coordinate (i.e., belonging to the same layer)
belong to the domain. It replaces the much stronger condition 2 which required that for
each i ∈ I , Yi = {x: x ⊆ X & xi ∈ D} is closed under finite and infinite unions. 2∗ requires
only that
⋃
y∈Yi(y) be in Yi.
11 Theorems of WSLM are marked with “WSLMT”.
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An example of a WS Layered Model that is not also a Layered Model is the single-
layered model with the following domain:
Layer 0: [0,1]0, (1,2)0, [2,3]0, [0,3]0
Here, there is a sum, [0,3]0, of all members of Layer 0, but no sum of [0,1]0 and (1,2)0,
of (1,2)0 and [2,3]0, or of [0,1]0 and [2,3]0 (see Fig. 2).
Intermediate theories between WSLM and Layered Mereotopology can be obtained by
adding axioms to WSLM. For example, either of the following axioms, when added to
WSLM, yields a somewhat stronger theory.
(i) Cxy → ∃z + (x,y, z)
(if x and y are connected, there is a sum of x and y)
(ii) Uxy → ∃z + (x,y, z)
(if x and y underlap, there is a sum of x and y)
(i) and (ii) are both theorems of Layered Mereotopology. Neither is satisfied by the four-
element WS Layered Model above. (i) would be satisfied if the domain were extended as
follows:
Layer 0: [0,1]0, (1,2)0, [2,3]0, [0,2)0, (1,3]0, [0,3]0
(ii) requires that, in addition, the model contains a sum of [0,1]0 and [2,3]0. It would be
satisfied if the domain were further extended to include ([0,1] ∪ [2,3])0. With this last
addition, the model qualifies as a Layered Model. But even if (ii) is added to WSLM, the
resulting theory is still weaker than Layered Mereotopology. For example, the WS Layered
Model with the domain
Layer 0: {x0: x is a non-empty closed subset of }
satisfies (ii) and the axioms of WSLM, but is not a model of Layered Mereotopology.12
12 To see that this structure is not a model of Layered Mereotopology, notice that, for example, there is no
difference of [0,1]0 in [0,2]0 in this model.
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7. Region-Free Layered MereotopologyLayered Mereotopology assumes that the spatial domain includes a special collection
of entities, the regions, which cover the entire space in the sense that every member of
the domain completely coincides with some region. We can think of the region layer as
the fixed background structure of all possible locations in the universe. In this sense, the
regions act like parts of a Newtonian absolute space.
In Layered Mereotopology, all relative location relations (Coin,Cov,CCoin,M,A) are
defined in terms of regions. We might wonder whether we can introduce these relations
without regions. There are at least two reasons for investigating a region-free variant of
Layered Mereotopology. The first is that there are some good philosophical and scientific
reasons for at least being cautious about, if not for rejecting outright, the assumption that
there is some immaterial structure in which all spatial entities are located. See, for exam-
ple, Leibniz’s criticism of the Newtonian view in his correspondence with Clarke [12] and
a more contemporary discussion in [16]. Secondly, even if we do accept some kind of back-
ground spatial structure theoretically, in many practical contexts we seem to reason about
the relative locations of spatial entities without reference to their regions. For example, to
represent a table as contained in (in my terminology: covered by) the interior of a room,
we do not seem to need to refer to the regions at which the table and the interior of the
room are located.
Regions are likely to be useful for reasoning about motion in a time-inclusive version of
Layered Mereotopology. They may also be useful for reasoning about more sophisticated
spatial relations, such as orientation and distance relations. These seem to assume some
kind of underlying structure similar to a Euclidean space. But for static reasoning about the
fairly simple relations introduced in this paper, we may want to do without the assumption
that there is a separate region layer.
The purpose of this section is to propose a variant of Layered Mereotopology which
I shall call Region-Free Layered Mereotopology (RFLM). The mereological subtheory of
RFLM is just Layered Mereology. There is no region function in RFLM. Instead, the binary
relation Cov is treated as a primitive.
On the intended interpretation
Cov(x,y)
means:
x is contained in y.
Here “contained in” is to be understood in the sense of “the water is contained in the
interior of the vase” (i.e., the water occupies part of the interior of the vase) not in the
sense of “the water is contained in the vase” (i.e., the water is partially surrounded and
held in place by the vase). This interpretation of the Cov relation is consistent with the
intended interpretation of Cov in Layered Mereotopology.
Coincidence and complete coincidence are defined in terms of Cov as follows:13
13 Axioms specific to RFLM are marked with “RF”, definitions with “RFD”, and theorems with “RFT”.
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(RFD1) Coin(x,y) =: ∃z (Cov(z,x) & Cov(z,y))
(x and y coincide: there is some z that is covered by both x and y)
(RFD2) CCoin(x,y) =: Cov(x,y) & Cov(y,x)
(x and y completely coincide: x is covered by y and y is covered by x)
Axioms for the Cov relation are:
(RF1) Cov(x,y) & Cov(y, z) → Cov(x, z)
(Cov is transitive)
(RF2) Pxy → Cov(x,y)
(if x is part of y, then x is covered by y)
(RF3) Uxy & Coin(x,y) → Oxy
(if x and y are parts of the same layer and x coincides with y, then x overlaps y)
Notice that counterparts of (RF1)–(RF3) are theorems of Layered Mereotopology.
It is easy to see that, in RFLM as in Layered Mereotopology, Cov is reflexive, CCoin
is an equivalence relation, and Coin is reflexive and symmetric. In addition, the follow-
ing theorems can be derived from (P1)–(P6) and (RF1)–(RF3). All of their counterparts
using the relative location relations of Layered Mereotopology are theorems of Layered
Mereotopology.
(RFT1) Oxy → Coin(x,y)
(if x overlaps y, then x coincides with y)
(RFT2) Uxy & Cov(x,y) → Pxy
(if x and y are in the same layer and x is covered by y, then x is part of y)
(RFT3) CCoin(x,y) & CCoin(x, z) & Uyz → y = z
(any object can completely coincide with at most one object in any layer)
(RFT4) CCoin(x,y) & Uxy → x = y
(if x and y completely coincide and are on the same layer, then x = y)
To transform Layered Models into region-free models, we need to eliminate the r func-
tion and delete the first condition on the domains (stating that x0 ∈ D, whenever xi ∈ D).
When P is interpreted as P and Cov as Cov, axioms (P1)–(P6) and (RF1)–(RF3) are sat-
isfied. But notice that now Coin need not correspond to the relation Coin. For example,
consider the model with the following two-element domain:
Layer 0: [0,2]0
Layer 1: [1,3]1
Here 〈[0,2]0, [1,3]1〉 ∈ Coin, since [0,2] ∩ [1,3] = ∅. But nothing in this domain is cov-
ered by both [0,2]0 and [1,3]1. Thus, [0,2]0 and [1,3]1 do not stand in the Coin relation
defined in (RFD1).
Analogous unintended interpretations would have arisen if either Coin or CCoin were
treated as the primitive in terms of which the remaining two relations were defined.
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A solution is to strengthen the conditions on the domains of the models in order to
make up for the loss of the region layer. As the background collection of all possible
locations, the region layer had served as the finest possible grid in terms of which the spatial
structure of all members of the domain could be analyzed. Layered Mereotopology allows
that the parthood structure of an arbitrary pair of entities may be too coarse for determining
their relative location relations (as it is above in the case of [0,2]0 and [1,3]1). Since
relative location is determined in Layered Mereotopology by relations among regions, we
need only assume that the regions have a clear spatial structure. When the region layer is
eliminated, we need to strengthen our assumptions about the spatial structure of arbitrary
members of the domain. One minimal way of doing this is by replacing condition 4 on the
domains of the models with the following stronger condition:
4∗. If xi, yj ∈ D and x ∩ y = ∅, then (x ∩ y)i ∈ D or (x ∩ y)j ∈ D.
4∗ requires that whenever two entities coincide, at least one of them has a part that corre-
sponds to their common location. For example, if a table is only partly in a room, then there
is a part of the table or a part of the interior of the room (or a part of each) that represents
their common location.
I will call the structures whose domains conform to conditions 2, 3, and 4∗, with all of
the relations of Section 2 except r, RF Layered Models. It is easy to check that when P
is interpreted as P and Cov as Cov in RF Layered Models, axioms (P1)–(P6) and (RF1)–
(RF3) are satisfied, CCoin is interpreted as CCoin, and Coin is interpreted as Coin.
For the purposes of adding topological relations to RFLM, the cross-layer relation, M,
rather than the intra-layer relation, C, should be treated as primitive. Again, the loss of the
region layer makes definitions of relative location relations problematic. We cannot assume
that the meeting of a pair of entities from different layers is reflected by the connecting of
a corresponding pair in a single layer. The interior of my glass meets the walls of the glass.
But, unless we assume a background structure of regions, there seems to be no completely
coincident pair that stands in the connection relation. As another example, consider the
following domain of a RF Layered Model.
Layer 0: [0,1]0
Layer 1: (1,2]1
〈[0,1]0, (1,2]1〉 ∈ M, but C is just the identity relation in this model. There is no pair in C
whose coordinates completely coincide with those of 〈[0,1]0, (1,2]1〉.
Axioms for the meets relation (M) can be given as follows.
(RF4) Mxx
(M is reflexive)
(RF5) Mxy → Myx
(M is symmetric)
(RF6) Pxy → ∀z(Mzx → Mzy)
(if x is part of y, then everything that meets x also meets y)
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The counterparts of (RF4)–(RF6) using the meets relation defined in Section 5 are all
theorems of Layered Mereotopology.
Connection (C) and abutment (A) are defined in RFLM as
(RFD3) Cxy =: Uxy & Mxy
(x and y are connected: x and y are on the same layer and x and y meet)
(RFD4) Axy =: Mxy & ∼ Coin(x,y)
(x and y abut: x and y meet but do not coincide)
External Connection (EC), Tangential Parthood (TP), and Interior Parthood (IP) are de-
fined as in Layered Mereotopology.
It is easy to see that counterparts of axioms (C1)–(C6) are theorems of RFLM. The
counterparts of (C5) and (C6) (the two axioms that use the region function) are:
(RFT5) Cxy → Mxy
(if x and y are connected, then they meet)
(RFT6) Uxy & Mxy → Cxy
(if x and y are in the same layer and they meet, then they are connected)
Counterparts of all of the other theorems listed in Section 5 are also theorems of RFLM.
When P is interpreted as P, Cov as Cov, and M as M in RF Layered Models, all of the
axioms of RFLM are satisfied and all of the defined relations are interpreted as intended.
8. Conclusions, applications, and further work
The goal of this paper was to construct a mereotopology for domains that include co-
incident but non-overlapping entities. The result is an extension of mereotopology that
includes relative location relations and a region function in addition to mereotopological
relations.
The models given for Layered Mereotopology and its variants make explicit the in-
tended interpretations of the relations introduced in the theories and show that each theory
is sound. One important project for further work is to determine whether each theory is
complete with respect to its target class of models and, if not, to further strengthen its
axioms.
Layered Mereotopology and its variants are particularly appropriate for applications
that involve reasoning about objects that are located in holes. Reasoning about holes is
crucial in a wide variety of domains, including medicine (body cavities and orifices, see
[14]) and mechanics (valves, pathways formed by piping). For more examples and a further
discussion of holes, see [6].
The distinction between mereotopological and relative location relations is also critical
for geospatial sciences such as epidemiology and meteorology. Here, we locate entities
such as collections of bacteria or storm systems relative to geopolitical entities such cities
or countries, but we do not treat the epidemiological or meteorological phenomena as parts
of the geopolitical entities in which they are located. For further discussion of the applica-
tion of Layered Mereotopology to geospatial sciences see [10].
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Layered Mereotopology and its variants allow the same mereotopological relations to
apply directly to all spatial entities, including regions, material objects, and holes. This ap-
proach is an alternative to that of [8] in which mereotopological relations apply to material
objects only indirectly, via the spatial regions at which they are located. One advantage of
allowing direct descriptions of the mereotopological properties of material objects is that
this leaves open the possibility of attributing different structures to material objects and
the regions at which they are located. For example, we may wish to represent material ob-
jects as having only closed, regular, divisible parts, but represent spatial regions as sums of
points. Slight changes in the conditions on the domains of Layered Models (specifically,
condition 4) and in the axioms of Layered Mereotopology (specifically, (R4)) would allow
models in which the parts of different layers are restricted to different granularities.
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